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LOCATING THE SELF IN KIERKEGAARD AND ZEN 
George Adams 
In a tale about the Zen master Hakuin and in a passage from Kierkegaard's 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, we find curiously similar descriptions as to 
how the person of faith can respond to even the most demanding tribula-
tions in this life with a sense of complete composure and equanimity. In 
each case, the response to adversity is rooted in an understanding of the 
nature of the self, and its relationship to the realms of finitude and ultimacy. 
A more careful examination of the Kierkegaardian and Buddhist perspec-
tives reveals that these similar practical responses to worldly troubles are 
based on dramatically different concepts of the self. Kierkegaard locates the 
self in a subjective space where it is revealed as essentially unique, relation-
al, situated, and valued. This position contrasts sharply with the Buddhist 
doctrine of anatman, or non-self, viewed both in terms of the early Buddhist 
annihilationist doctrine and the later Mahayana absolutist positions. 
Introduction 
In a collection of Zen tales we read of the Zen Master Hakuin, renowned 
throughout the land for hif' wisdom and purity. When a beautiful young 
girl in the village became pregnant, rather than betraying her lover she 
falsely identified Hakuin as the father of the child. Her parents, outraged 
at such a scandalous act, went to Hakuin to confront him with their daugh-
ter's charge, to which Hakuin merely replied, "Is that so?" 
As a result of the allegation, Hakuin's reputation in the community was 
ruined, but he remained silent. When after its birth the baby was brought 
to him, he accepted it without argument and raised it well, until a year 
later when the girl, apparently feeling guilty about the lie she had told, 
confessed to her parents that the real father was not Hakuin, but rather a 
young man in the village. When the parents went to Hakuin to apologize 
for the terrible harm that they had caused him, he merely replied, "Is that 
so?," and returned the baby to them (Reps and Senzaki: 12-13). 
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, while describing the individual 
who truly understands resignation, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus writes: 
Suppose the world offers the individual everything. Perhaps he 
accepts it, but he says: Oh, well, but this "Oh well" signifies absolute 
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respect for the absolute telos. Suppose the world takes everything 
away from him; he may wince, but he says: Oh well - and this "Oh 
well" signifies the absolute respect for the absolute telos (411). 
In a certain sense, the attitudes displayed by Hakuin and Kierkegaard 
are remarkably similar: both demonstrate a profound sense of equanimity 
in the face of disastrous worldly circumstances, and in each case their atti-
tude is grounded in a religious cognitive framework which puts the world-
ly circumstance in a larger setting, thereby allowing each to relativize the 
significance of the harmfulness associated with worldly troubles. Both 
responses can be seen as rooted in what Kierkegaard called a "dying away 
from immediacy," or responding to events in life through constant primary 
reference to a sacred reality, rather than to the temporal event that con-
fronts one at any given moment. 
And yet, upon closer examination, what is even more fascinating about 
a comparison of these two passages is the fact that the virtually identical 
practical responses to a worldly event are actually rooted in radically dif-
ferent religious perspectives. Both the Zen and the Kierkegaardian 
responses derive from specific beliefs about the nature of the self, and this 
self's relationship to sacred reality, but the Zen and Kierkegaardian views 
of the self appear to be in fundamental opposition to each other. 
Specifically, Hakuin responds as a Buddhist who sees the individual self as 
essentially a non-entity in any ontologically permanent sense, while 
Kierkegaard's perspective reflects his Christian belief in the self as an entity 
that is valued, relational, situated, and ontologically unique. In the follow-
ing remarks we will examine these contrasting views of the self and 
explore the various ways in which they lead to a curious array of points of 
similarity and difference between Zen and Kierkegaard. 
The Zen Buddhist Sense of Self 
The Zen sense of equanimity displayed by Hakuin in the tale cited above is 
rooted in the Buddhist view of the self. Of course, identifying the precise 
nature of the Buddhist doctrine of the self is indeed a daunting task, con-
sidering that even the Buddha himself declined to elucidate on the issue 
when asked to do so by his disciples. The subsequent history of Buddhist 
thought can be seen in part as a struggle to clarify this very issue that was 
left unresolved by the Buddha, with different schools offering various 
interpretations of the true meaning of the doctrine of mzatman, or no-self. 
Since we cannot even begin to explore the full range of opinions on the 
nature of the self found in the history of Buddhist thought, we will confine 
our discussion to the early teaching on the doctrine of no-self and the later 
Mahayana concept of Sunyata, or Emptiness, which became an essential 
part of the Zen perspective. While there are, of course, other perspectives 
on the nature of the self in Buddhist thought, the doctrines of anatman and 
Sunyata are perhaps the most fundamental and basic, and hence most rep-
resentative of the overall Buddhist perspective. 
The concept of the self found in early Buddhism is closely related to the 
broader notion of anitya, or the impermanence of all phenomenal reality. 
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The early Buddhists described reality as something in a constant state of 
flux, characterized by an infinite series of changes behind which existed no 
substantial permanent reality. While some schools argued for the real exis-
tence of atoms, even these schools agreed that the atoms were in a state of 
constant change, and that the larger entities that came into existence by the 
collections of atoms were impermanent entities whose existence as aggre-
gates of atomic particles was only momentary. 
The importance of the belief in the impermanent nature of all phenome-
nal reality plays a crucial role in the Four Noble Truths. The Buddha's dec-
laration that suffering (duhkha) is caused by craving or desire is based on 
the underlying belief that any thing that we desire, by its very nature, will 
cease to exist at some point, thereby leaving our desire unfulfilled. 
Craving necessarily leads to suffering since what we crave for can never be 
acquired for more than a transitory moment, given the impermanence of 
all phenomenal reality. Similarly, liberation is brought about by non-
attachment to an phenomenal realities: by ceasing to desire and form 
attachments to realities that are in a constant state of flux, one avoids the 
pain of fruitless striving and can acquire the sense of equanimity character-
istic of niroana. The development of a state of consciousness characterized 
by a mature sense of non-attachment is described in the early sutras as pro-
ducing a wide range of benefits, including freedom from being affected by 
the "Eight Worldly Phenomena"(atthalokaddhamma), which are comprised 
of gain, loss, happiness, suffering, praise, blame, good repute and disre-
pute (Kalupahana: 73). 
But the impermanent nature of all phenomenal reality leads to a far 
more radical conclusion than merely the self's inability to achieve happi-
ness through attachment to such impermanent realties. Indeed, the very 
self that experiences craving and forms attachments is an impermanent 
reality, with no substantial existence or ontological status. This is perhaps 
most forcefully illustrated in the doctrine of the five skandhas, according to 
which that which we call a self or soul or ego-entity can be deconstructed 
into five parts, consisting of form, sensation, perception, mental activities, 
and consciousness (Becker: 6). Once the self is broken down into these 
five components, it becomes apparent that there is no entity that exists sep-
arate from these components, leading to the conclusion that there is no self, 
only a temporary aggregate of matter and mind which is erroneously per-
ceived as a thing-in-itself. 
This doctrine of anatman, or no-self, became a fundamental component 
of early Buddhist thought. A classic illustration of anatman is found in The 
Questions of King Milinda, where the Buddhist monk Nagasena is brought 
before the Greek King Milinda to explain the principles of Buddhism. The 
lengthy discourse between the two men begins with Milinda simply asking 
Nagasena to state his name and title, to which Nagasena responds by 
reminding the king that while he is known as "Nagasena," this is nothing 
but a word, and that "there is no permanent self involved in the matter" 
(40). When Milinda presses Nagasena to clarify his remarks, the Buddhist 
reverts to the use of the chariot analogy, demonstrating that just as what 
we call a "chariot" is nothing more than the collection of parts such as an 
axle, a harness, wheels, etc., and that when the parts are removed no chari-
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ot remains, so likewise what we call the self is merely a name for the 
momentary collection of skandhas, and once these are dispersed no self 
remains (43-45). 
In early Buddhism, given the Buddha's reported reluctance to speculate 
on metaphysical issues, the doctrine of anatman was presented indepen-
dent of reference to any broader understanding of the ultimate nature of 
reality. This quickly changed, however, as various schools attempted to 
formulate a view of existence that was faithful to the anatman doctrine but 
also provided a more comprehensive description of the nature of all things. 
In doing so, the Mahayana schools, including Zen, moved from the early 
Buddhist view of the self as a temporary collection of elements to a more 
metaphysical concept of reality in which the self is relativized, if not anni-
hilated, in the context of the ineffable, non-dual ultimate nature of things. 
In Zen, one concept that became a preferred way of describing reality as 
a whole, or the ultimate nature of things, is Sunyata, or Emptiness. 
Deriving from a sense of reality that is rooted in a mode of consciousness 
that generates perceptions that are claimed to be ineffable, by definition it 
is a difficult and perhaps misguided task to attempt to articulate the mean-
ing of Emptiness. Clearly not intended as a nihilistic expression, Swzyata 
is perhaps best described as a variant of the advaitic, or non-dual percep-
tion of reality, according to which the ordinary experience of reality as a 
complex of separate entities is invalidated. Ordinary dualistic, binary con-
cepts of self-other, past-present, here-there, subject-object, nirvana-samsara, 
etc., are denied any substantial ontological status. Beyond this, a more 
positive and clear description of Sunyata is difficult to achieve, but for our 
purposes in assessing the Zen sense of self, what is quite clear is that the 
abiding reality of a separate ego-self clearly is not included in this perspec-
tive. 
This is reflected in numerous passages in the Diamond Sutra, one of the 
most significant scriptures in the Zen tradition. In response to Subhuti's 
request for criteria to identify the person who has achieved enlightenment, 
the Buddha responds that, "If a Bodhisattva cherishes the idea of an ego-
entity, a personality, a being, or a separated individuality, he is conse-
quently not a Bodhisattva" (52). 
This perspective results in a remarkable paradox: the Bodhisattva's goal 
is to work toward the enlightenment of all beings in the universe, yet when 
seen in the light of Sunyata, it becomes clear that there are no beings to lib-
erate. Thus, the Buddha declares: 
Let no one say the Tathagata cherishes the idea: I must liberate allliv-
ing beings. Allow no such thought, Subhuti. Wherefore? Because in 
reality there are no living beings to be liberated by the Tathagata. If 
there were living beings for the Tathagata to liberate, he would par-
take in the idea of selfhood, personality entity, and separate individu-
ality (64). 
From a Zen perspective, however, a strictly negative characterization of 
the self would be inaccurate, in that it would reflect the very dualistic type 
of thinking that needs to be transcended. While it is inaccurate to say that a 
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self exists, it is equally inaccurate to say that a self does not exist. Indeed, 
when perceived in light of the ultimately empty nature of all things, the 
self both exists and does not exist, all within the context of the abiding 
Emptiness of all things. Sometimes this is expressed in the notion of the 
interpenetration of all things, in which the individual, separated status of 
an entity is denied, while affirming its existence as an element of the non-
dual Suchness of things. Thus, Masao Abe states that, 
everything in the world is real in itself; and yet, on the other hand, 
there is no hindrance between anyone thing and any other thing -
everything is equal, interchangeable, and interfusing. Thus we may 
say: 'Mountains are waters, waters are mountains.' It is here in this 
awakening in which the great negation is a great affirmation that Zen 
says, 'A bridge flows, whereas water does not flow,' or 'When Lee 
drinks the wine, Chang gets drunk'(18). 
The Self in Kierkegaard 
As challenging as the task may be to identify a representative position 
regarding the sense of the self in Buddhism in general and Zen in particular, 
it is an equally difficult task to establish a clear and consistent account of 
how Kierkegaard viewed the self, given his frequent tendency to write in 
an intentionally unsystematic and obscure style. Here we shall attempt to 
simply identify several basic themes that seem to be present whenever 
Kierkegaard discusses the nature of the self. These basic themes can be 
surrunarized as: 1) the self is situated; 2) the self is unique and limited; 3) 
the self exists in a relational mode of being; and 4) the self is a valued entity. 
The situated character of the self refers to the fact that the self comes into 
existence in a specific spatia-temporal setting: it is not an entity which 
exists in a timeless realm of undefined being, but rather an entity which 
finds itself located in a very precise and limited place. Kierkegaard, in fact, 
sees an essential part of faith as the willingness to accept the givenness of 
where one is as an expression of the divine will. Thus, through the words 
of Judge William Kierkegaard declares that the believer accepts "the exis-
tence, the actuality, in which God has placed him" (Kierkegaard 1987, II: 
244), and does not attempt to pursue spiritual practices that claim to offer 
an identity that transcends the specific and limited setting in which he 
exists in everyday life. 
Given the situational nature of the self, it follows that the self must also 
exist in relation to the other beings and things that are present in the setting 
in which it is present. Part of the relational nature of the self involves the 
relationship with other finite realities, but Kierkegaard argues that ''becom-
ing a self" in the fullest sense also includes recognizing and accepting the 
reality of the transcendent, infinite being to which one also stands in rela-
tion. For Kierkegaard, the more one develops one's subjective awareness of 
reality, the more one becomes subjectively aware that reality is not confined 
to the gross material world, but rather also includes a real, infinite Spirit, or 
God. The self which denies this transcendent reality is a self which is 
engaged in the practice of self-delusion, since an honest exploration of what 
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one encounters in the depths of one's subjectivity opens up the reality of the 
being that transcends both one's self and the world in which the self exists. 
To deny God is to deny that which the self intuitively knows, and to persist 
in denying what the self knows is to stunt the development of the self. 
Hence, according to Stephan Evans, "Genuine selfhood requires that I 
stand before God, accepting the self I am as a gift from God and the self that 
I should become as a task God has set before me" (Evans: 48). 
Kierkegaard also sees an accurate sense of the self as recognizing and 
accepting that the self is only a self: a very specific and limited entity, locat-
ed in a specific space and time, with specific and limited qualities. Rejec1.ing 
the type of spirituality that suggests that the individual self can only be 
experienced in its authentic fullness when it is seen as part of a larger reality 
(as, for instance, in the Vedantic identification of tit man and Brahman), 
Kierkegaard (again through Judge William) instead argues that true aware-
ness of the nature of one's self occurs only when one "becomes conscious as 
this specific individual with these capacities, these inclinations, these drives, 
theses passions, influenced by this specific social milieu, as this specific 
product of a specific environment" (Kierkegaard 1987, II: 251). 
In the Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus looks at the 
human tendency to inflate the self to cosmic proportions as a sign of spiritu-
al despair: "Every human existence that presumably has become or simply 
wants to be infinite, in fact, every moment in which a human existence has 
become or simply wants to be infinite, is despair" (30). This spiritual 
despair is also seen by Kierkegaard as a type of defiance, in which the self 
attempts to define itself as something which it is not and deny that which it 
is: "the self in despair wants to be master of itself or to create itself, to make 
his self into the self he wants to be ... He does not want to put on his own 
self, does not want to see his given self as his task" (Kierkegaard 1980: 68). 
But while asserting that the self is a finite, specific, and limited being 
confined to a precise place in space and time, Kierkegaard does not in any 
way see this as grounds for diminishing the significance and value of the 
self. Quite to the contrary, he asserts that a self is that which should be 
supremely valued above all else. Even in its smallness and limitedness, it 
is nonetheless an infinitely precious entity whose existence is qualitatively 
valued in a manner that is different from how anything else in existence is 
valued. He further argues that when this unique quality of the self is rec-
ognized by the self, there results an awareness of the sense that its exis-
tence is something that should never end. That is, a self is such a unique 
and precious entity that in a universe governed by a good God, there must 
be the possibility of the eternal preservation of that self - not as some larger 
cosmic entity, but precisely as a limited, specific, unique being. Hence, 
Kierkegaard declares that the person who has acquired a true understand-
ing of the nature of the self also develops an "infinite, personal, impas-
sioned interestedness" (Kierkegaard 1992: 27) in the self's eternal existence. 
On Locating the Self 
Returning to the passages regarding the Zen monk and Kierkegaard's 
Climacus which opened our paper, what then can be said regarding the 
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broader implications of these passages for our comparison of the 
Kierkegaardian and Zen perspectives? Before returning specifically to 
those passages, however, a brief note should be made regarding certain 
interesting points of similarity that can be drawn out of the above analyses 
of the Zen and Kierkegaardian views. 
Clearly, both Kierkegaard and Zen are operating from religious episte-
mologies which place significant limitations on the value of reason and ele-
vate the role of an internal mode of knowing, which is neither reached nor 
verified solely through reason, in discerning religious truth. In each tradi-
tion, one cannot arrive at the desired spiritual subjectivity through a 
process of logical analysis and rational deduction. In Kierkegaard, this 
position is most closely associated with the widely-quoted but frequently 
misunderstood dictum that, "Truth is subjectivity." Kierkegaard harshly 
criticized those in the Christian community who sought to demonstrate the 
validity of Christian faith solely through a process of logical reasoning, 
supported by historical research and empirical observation. For 
Kierkegaard, religious truth was not a reality that could be "proven" or 
"disproven" through our ordinary external means of knowledge. Rather, 
the truth of God's existence (and the reality of God's nature) was some-
thing directly knowable only to the person who had entered into what he 
referred to as the correct "subjectivity." And what one came to know in 
this subjectivity, or state of consciousness, was a type of knowledge that 
could never be acquired through any objective pursuit of truth, no matter 
how complex, extensive, or sophisticated. Of course, this does not mean 
that reason has no function at all in religious thought and discourse: 
Kierkegaard recognized that reasoning must be used to communicate, or 
point to, the nature of the believer's subjectivity, and much of his author-
ship, especially in the pseudonymous works, can be seen as an attempt to 
rationally articulate the content of that subjectivity. As Carr and Ivanhoe 
remark, "The internal coherence of Kierkegaard's position and the tight-
ness of many of his arguments demonstrate a healthy respect for reason, 
properly employed" (Carr and Ivanhoe 2000: 44). Still, for Kierkegaard, 
the means by which religious truth and knowledge of the true nature of the 
self are initially acquired is not reason, but rather the acquisition of a spe-
cific subjectivity from which the existence and nature of God and the self 
become transparent. 
All of this sounds rather similar to Zen, where discourse about the ulti-
mate nature of things frequently adopts a decidedly non-rational character, 
replete with contradictory and non-sensical assertions. In the use of koans 
and in the unorthodox teaching methods of the Rinzai sect, we see an 
intentional and explicit attempt to move the student's consciousness out-
side the realm of objective thought and into a specific subjectivity, or non-
ordinary mode of awareness, in which the true nature of things becomes 
immediately apparent. From this enlightened subjectivity, seemingly 
absurd statements such as "Nirvana is samsara," and "Emptiness is form," 
become meaningful and clear, in spite of the contradiction that they 
embody at the rational level. 
While we find the use of paradox and absurdity in both Kierkegaard 
and Zen, the similarity is a superficial one that masks substantial founda-
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tional differences. In Zen, absurdity and paradox derive from the broad 
and all-encompassing contrast between the ordinary, dualistic perception 
of reality, and the enlightened perspective which sees all in the light of the 
pure, non-dual Emptiness or Suchness. For Kierkegaard, however, absur-
dity and paradox derive specifically and solely from the incarnation, or the 
fact that God came into existence in the form of a finite human being, at a 
particular time and place in history, and that our salvation is dependent on 
whether or not we believe that that event, for which we have no objective 
means of verification, actually occurred. Hence, the paradox and absurdity 
in Zen is based on an element not found in Kierkegaard's vision of 
Christian faith, and the paradox and absurdity in Kierkegaard is based on 
a belief that is absent in Zen. 
One is also struck by the strong role of simplicity in both Zen and 
Kierkegaard. In Zen, we have the ideal of the quiet monk, who, though 
possessing the perfect wisdom and having achieved the highest levels of 
awareness, is content to live the quiet life of "chopping wood and carrying 
water." In Kierkegaard, we see a similar portrayal of the Christian believer 
as the one whose inner wisdom is in inverse proportion to outer displays 
of learning and public religiosity. As Climacus states in the Postscript, 
"True inwardness demands absolutely no outward sign," or, even more 
succinctly, "the less outwardness, the more inwardness" (Kierkegaard 
1992: 414).1 
When we return, however, to the specific issue of the basis for equanim-
ity, as described in the initial passages, we see two very different founda-
tional beliefs. 
Hahlin's equanimity can be seen as grounded in two basic Buddhist 
principles: anatman and Sunyata. To the extent that Hakuin perceives his 
self as merely a temporary collection of elements rather than a permanent 
ontological entity, any threat to that self, such as the destruction of his rep-
utation in the story we are looking at, assumes a rather insignificant nature. 
Damage to the self is not something to be feared, since the self is essentially 
a non-entity, or, at best, a name applied to a temporary collection of ele-
ments. Hakuin's equanimity remains unshaken in the face of scandalous 
and false charges against him because he recognizes that there is no 
"Hakuin" whose reputation needs to be defended and protected. Freed 
from the illusion of a permanent self, he also is freed from anxiety over any 
threat to that self. 
But Hakuin's equanimity can be interpreted as deriving not only from 
his awareness of the non-existence of a self, but equally from his positive 
awareness of the pure, non-dual, all-encompassing Emptiness that perme-
ates all being. The troublesome transitory events that occur in the samsaric 
realm acquire a new meaning when seen in the reality of the Emptiness or 
Suchness of all things. When subject and object are no longer differentiat-
ed, there is no "other" that can threaten the "self," since both are recog-
nized as manifestations of the non-dual Emptiness. Hakuin, resting firmly 
in his awareness of Emptiness, is not troubled by the false charges against 
him, given that they derive from a reality that is relative and transitory, 
and even in a sense non-existent. Resting in awareness of Emptiness, only 
Emptiness matters. 
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In contrast, we find that Kierkegaard's equanimity rests in the aware-
ness of the self's existence in a relationship with a God, a relationship that 
is of ultimate importance and which provides a framework from which all 
other events are viewed. 
Kierkegaard argues that the self really does exist, and it exists at every 
moment in a relationship with a being that stands over against it. Indeed, 
it is a relationship that exists even when the self, consciously or uncon-
sciously, attempts to deny it. Kierkegaard sees the person without faith as 
burdened with the task of interpreting his life in an immanent context, or 
with reference only to other worldly realities. The person of faith, howev-
er, while fully acknowledging the existence of the finite world, and indeed 
(like a bodhisattva), choosing to remain fully immersed in it, nonetheless 
views everything that happens in the finite world in the context of the 
God-relationship. Hence, worldly afflictions, as well as worldly gains, are 
radically relativized by being cast in the context of the person's God-rela-
tionship. Kierkegaard is saying that selves are real, and real events, some-
times of a quite terrible nature, happen to selves. But the self who is 
assaulted by life's woes can bear them with equanimity, because their 
meaning and value are always viewed in the context of the self-God rela-
tionship, which ultimately is the only thing that matters. 
Kierkegaard neither denies the existence of the self nor the realm of 
finite multiplicity in which the self resides. But he suggests that anything 
that happens to the self in that samsaric realm can be handled with equa-
nimity if the person is firmly grounded in a constant awareness of his rela-
tionship with God. 
A possible reconciliation of the Zen and Kierkegaardian positions on the 
self might be offered on the grounds that Zen does not really deny the exis-
tence of the self in a categorical sense. To make such a denial would reflect 
the very dualistic thinking that Zen rejects. Rather than asserting that a self 
does not exist, Zen asserts both that a self exists and does not exist, or that 
it is neither the case that a self exists nor that a self does not exist. To make 
any naive declaration about phenomenal reality which reflects the dualism 
of is and is-not or being and non-being is to speak in a manner that is for-
eign to the Zen sense of the non-dual Emptiness or Suchness, of which no 
descriptive statement can accurately be made. 
But for Kierkegaard, such ambiguity about the nature of the self is sim-
ply not acceptable. To him, the self's reality is so significant that there can 
be no equivocation or qualification in discussing its nature. When the indi-
vidual enters into the subjectivity that is characteristic of genuine faith, the 
reality of the self as itself (that is, as a finite and limited, but real entity) is 
encountered, as is the self's relationship to another being, or God. In this 
subjectivity one encounters a self whose existence and importance are such 
that there is no possible modification of the self, whether through diminu-
tion to non-existence or through expansion into a metaphysical absolute. 
To Kierkegaard, the Buddhist position that there both is and is not a self 
cannot be accepted, since the self's existence in the subjectivity of faith is 
real in the fullest and most uncompromising sense. 
What then can be said regarding the reconciliation of the Kierkegaardian 
and Zen positions? Clearly they share much in common: the limitations of 
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reason as a means to knowledge of the ultimate; the use of paradox and the 
absurd; and, above all, the importance of enteling the subjective realm to 
discover spiritual truth. And clearly, both the Kierkegaardian and Zen per-
spectives can lead to virtually identical ways of managing practical chal-
lenges in everyday life, as illustrated in our opening passages 
And yet, each party is clearly basing its position on knowledge found 
in a different subjective space. Both look to the realm of subjectivity, but 
each locates the truth about the nature of the self in a different mode of 
awareness. The Zen practitioner locates valid knowledge in a subjective 
space which reveals a self that lacks reality; the Kierkegaardian believer, 
operating from a different subjective space, discovers a self that exists in a 
relationship to a God. Both perspectives point to something (a self) that 
can be discovered through a specific path (in Zen, through meditation and 
study; in Christianity, through faith, prayer, and worship), but each tradi-
tion seems to identify a different subjectivity as the place where the true 
nature of the self is located. Zen values an internal space from which the 
self appears to be an insubstantial entity, while Kierkegaard directs us to a 
different location in the realm of subjective awareness, where one discov-
ers not just a self, but a self-in-relation to a God. Hence, Kierkegaard and 
Zen both locate the truth about the self internally, but at different specific 
internal locations, or subjectivities. Each is grounded in a subjectivist epis-
temology, but each epistemology points to a different subjective space as 
the place where the true nature of the self can be found. 
NOTES 
Susquehanna University 
Lycoming College 
1. This is not to suggest, of course, that the role of external moral behavior 
is unimportant in either Buddhism or Kierkegaard. In Buddhaghosa's classic 
systematic compendium of the Buddhist dharma, the Visuddhimagga, morality 
(sila) is identified as the first, necessary step in the path toward nirvana, fol-
lowed by concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna). In the Works of Love, 
Kierkegaaard observes that "fruits," or external acts of kindness, are a neces-
sary part of Christian faith. 
WORKS CITED 
Abe, Masao. Zen and Western Thought. Ed. William R. LaFleur. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1985. 
Becker, Carl B. Breaking the Circle: Death and the Afterlife in Buddhism. 
Carbondale: Southern illinois University Press, 1993. 
Buddhaghosa. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Seattle: Buddhist 
Publication Society, 1991. 
Carr, Karen L., and Ivanhoe, Philip J. The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious 
Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard. New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000. 
The Diamond Sutra and the Sutra ofHui Neng. Trans. AF. Price and Wong Mou-
Lam. Boulder: Shambala, 1969. 
Evans, C. Stephan. Soren Kierkegaard's Christian Psychology. Grand Rapids, MI: 
380 Faith and Philosophy 
Zondervan, 1990. 
Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. Honolulu: 
University Press of Hawaii, 1976. 
Kierkegaard, Soren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Trans. Howard V. and 
Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
_. Either/Or. Trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1987. 
___ . The Sickness Unto Death. Trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980. 
_. Works of Love. Trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong. New York: Harper 
Torchbooks,1962. 
The Questions of King Milinda. Trans. T.W. Rhys Davids. 2 vols. New York: 
Dover Publications, 1963. 
Reps, Paul and Senzaki, Nyogen. Zen Flesh, Zen Bones: A Collection of Zen and 
Pre-Zen Writings. Boston: Shambala, 1994. 
